The war was over and the institutions of the state were at stake. On 6 June 1999, President “Nino” Vieira was allowed to leave the Portuguese Embassy to seek political asylum in Portugal via The Gambia. Vieira signed a document stating that he was ready to stand trial in Bissau in exchange for legal guarantees. He did not return. Politicians and the military have reaffirmed their support for democratic elections and a return to peace. But the public treasury was empty and the economy was almost paralyzed. Donors were skeptical. The authority of the state depended on the military power of the victorious “junta”. The following months were marked by the efforts of the civilian government to establish its authority and by the army`s efforts to “stay in the barracks”.
4 Another important contour is the centrality of an effective delivery mechanism (Stedman 2001). In order for the parties to the conflict to respect the terms of a peace agreement, a third party or party must be prepared to play the role of “Forceur” (Stedman 2001); Derouen and Wallensteen 2009; Mattes and Savun 2009). In other words, third parties or parties must be prepared to use the necessary resources and use them in the implementation of the peace agreement. Finally, on the basis of the Liberian case, according to the model of the peace agreement, there are several valuable lessons that, at present and in the future, could be learned and applied to peace-making activities in other African and world countries. The first international participation was led by Chadian President Idriss Déby, who expressed concern about the impact of conflict-related forced displacement on Chad and had many in both the GoS (which helped him take power) and the Zaghawa leaders within the SLA (his own ethnic group is Zaghawa). In September 2003, he negotiated a 45-day ceasefire between the GoS and SLM/A in the Chadian border town of Abeché. The ceasefire soon dissolved and other Abéché meetings failed, blaming breaches of MLS/A and DM requirements. This statement seriously affected his credibility as an impartial mediator and prompted the rebels to demand an international presence of observers in further discussions. With the help of the African Union (AU), Chad negotiated a ceasefire agreement in N`Djamena, Chad, in April 2004 that allowed humanitarian access to Darfur between goS and a joint MLS/A and JEM delegation. The GoS had opposed the participation of the United States, the EU and the United Nations and ultimately compromised the AU as a mediator, with international observation only possible for discussions on humanitarian issues. The appeasement that can serve as an effective “carrot” to enforce a peace agreement by a recalcitrant faction.
In this case, the act of appeasement should be specific and calibrated on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, the use of appeasement can be counterproductive if used over and over again, and it does not take into account the specifics of a case. The contribution to the “lack of commitment” of the parties to the conflict could be a significant negative outcome. Such a result is made possible by the conviction of the various parties that the “peacemaker” would constantly respond to their repeated requests (Stedman 1997).